framed knowledge gaps in terms of "narrowing the uncertainties." These uncertainties were concerned primarily with predicting the Earth's climate system, and "significant progress in knowledge" was deemed to be at least a decade-long venture. A decade later, the IPCC AR3 reconsidered the matter and framed the task of reducing knowledge gaps differently, this time in terms of "advancing our understanding." By this was meant a portfolio of activities related to, among other things: more comprehensive data; expanded process studies; testing Earth system models; developing probabilistic predictions; understanding nonlinear behaviour.
3 In 2007, the IPCC's AR4 framed gaps in knowledge in terms of "key uncertainties" and listed eighteen of them across all three working groups; for example: attribution and detection at smaller than continental scales; future changes in ice sheet mass balances; the effects of non-climate policies on future emissions. But unlike in 1990, no timescale was placed on when these key uncertainties would be reduced. "will take responsibility to mobilise knowledge for action" and provide society with the needed scientific information. And then at Planet under Pressure 2012, which led to the creation of Future Earth, the declaration called for research to "integrate across existing research programmes and disciplines, across all domains of research as well as local knowledge systems, across the North and South, and must be co-designed and implemented with input from governments, civil society, research funders and the private sector."
5
These various statements from global change assessments and programs reveal a number of recurring themes about the framing of knowledge gaps: a concern with narrowing uncertainties, especially with regard to prediction; a desire to integrate knowledge across disciplines and across all knowledges, scales, and actors; and a link between knowledge and action-the latter, it seems, meaning decision making and solution forming. The sentiment is summarized well in a The first framework sees knowledge as progressing in linear fashion. This heuristic emerges from a particular view of science and is epitomized by the IPCC's desire to "reduce the uncertainties in predictions." Knowledge here is progressive, ignorance is finite, and discovery leads to ever more complete understanding. Interestingly, this view parallels the "God of the gaps" critique of theology: as humans know more about the physical world, there is less need, so the argument goes, for any causal agency for God, until eventually this Being is discredited altogether. It is a heuristic that religious apologists have worked hard to dislodge. It assumes a particular view of God, just as in science this linear view assumes a particular view of knowledge.
A second view conceives knowledge gaps as the result of poor connectivity. What is needed is better integration of existing knowledge. Integrating different knowledges is a form of gap filling, as ever more comprehensive and faithful replicas of reality are built in our minds or in our models. The 2012 Planet under Pressure Declaration placed huge faith in this form of gap filling, desiring to "integrate across all domains and regions."
13
A third view of knowledge gaps is that they are socially contingent. That is, knowledge is constructed as a result of social norms and processes. As these processes change over time, so too does the credibility of what is known and the definition of (and urgency of finding) what is not known. Rather than progressing in a straight line-ever onward, inward, or upward-the processes and products of knowledge generation are often convoluted and entangled.
A final approach to gaps in knowledge is to see them as places of brittleness or weakness. This heuristic requires knowledge to be thickened: adding layers of meaning and significance to our experience and understanding of reality. The humanities are not on a search to discover new knowledge per se or even to connect or integrate existing knowledge. Rather, the humanities draw attention to relevant ideas that will never admit a technical solution: ideas like justice, equity, goodness, humility, and democracy.
These disciplines frequently pose normative questions that, rather than being resolved, can only be better or more deeply understood. Here, knowledge is deepened rather than knowledge gaps, decision making and policy enactment would be an easier thing to do-and the world would be a better and more sustainable place. Kathleen O'Reilly puts this claim succinctly, in the context of knowledge for development: "If we knew just a bit more, success would be imminent . . . there will come a point when we will know enough and then development interventions will deliver on their promised positive outcomes."
16
The linear model also opens an opportunity for strategic scepticism, 17 for casting doubt on knowledge not because doubt is warranted but because under the assumptions of the linear model such doubt undermines the need for action in the world.
18
But empirical reality does not bear out the simple optimism of the linear model.
19
The challenge of responding to climate change is to turn our gaze away from making firmer, newer, or more integrated scientific knowledge and instead to ask why enacting directed change is so hard to accomplish. 24 The danger in such a singular conception of "knowledge for policy" is well expressed in the words, again, of O'Reilly: "If the will to know is deployed to gain knowledge for controlling others, then the will to know is also a will to power. Although the will to power may be couched in terms of 'doing good,' it remains a desire to know the world in order to manipulate people's behaviour."
25
In the current unstable climate (both atmospheric and political, and of course the two are connected) it is becoming ever more important to engage directly with the politics of knowledge. The pursuit of knowledge is inevitably a political act, if only because the sorts of knowledge that one chooses to create and to endow with authority carry political ramifications. 26 Such confrontations cannot escape dealing with normative issues where, I have suggested, knowledge thickening, rather than gap filling, is the most that can be achieved. Reasoning together in public to make actionable knowledge must allow for the expression of contrasting value commitments, however inconvenient this may be.
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